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The Burden of Proof in Double Jeopardy Claims 
INTRODUCTION 
The fifth amendment protects criminal defendants against double 
jeopardy.1 Although the authorities generally agree that a defendant 
must plead double jeopardy before a court must consider the issue,2 
they disagree over where the burden of proof lies once a defendant 
raises such a claim. Traditionally, the defendant has had the burden 
of showing that the two crimes charged are the same in law and 
fact,3 but the federal courts have manifested a trend toward chang-
ing that rule. Several circuits4 now hold that once a defendant satis-
fies the burden of producing evidence by raising a nonfrivolous 
double jeopardy claim,5 the burden shifts to the government to per-
suade the trier of fact by a preponderance of evidence that the crimes 
1. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part ''nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Al-
though the amendment refers to jeopardy of life or limb, the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that the guarantee applies to all crimes. See Ex Parle Lange, 85 U.S. (1 Wall.) 163 (1873). 
2. The position may be traced to United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 150, 160 (1833), 
where Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[a]fter the judgment no subsequent prosecution 
could be maintained for the same offence, or for any part of it, provided the former conviction 
was pleaded." See also United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.) ("It is undis-
puted that the burden of going forward by putting the double jeopardy claim in issue is and 
should be on the defendant."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979); McClain v. Brown, 587 F.2d 
389, 391 (8th Cir. 1978) ("A bar to further prosecution because of former jeopardy is not a 
jurisdictional defect, but a defense or personal right which must be affirmatively pleaded or is 
considered waived."); United States v. Young, 503 F.2d 1072, 1074 (3d Cir. 1974) ("It is mani-
fest that a claim of double jeopardy is an affirmative defense which must be raised properly or 
may be deemed waived"); United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The 
constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which, if not affirmatively 
pleaded by the defendant at the time of trial, will be regarded as waived."); State v. Cutshall, 
278 N.C. 334, 343, 180 S.E.2d 745, 751 (1971) (defendant deemed to have abandoned double 
jeopardy claim when he failed to plead double jeopardy and to offer evidence in support of 
that pleading). 
3. See United States v. Inryco, Inc., 1981-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) f 64,244 at 74,006 (D. Md. 
1981); see also notes 15-19 infra and accompanying text. 
4. See note 28 infra and accompanying text. But see note 29 infra and accompanying text. 
5. The double jeopardy cases do not discuss the evidentiary strength required to raise a 
nonfrivolous claim of double jeopardy. Federal courts have, however, denied a frivolous 
pleading. A claim is frivolous if its " 'insufficiency . . . is so glaring that the court can deter-
mine it upon a bare inspection, without argument.'" United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 
227 (1934) (quoting First Natl. Bank v. Lang, 94 Minn. 261, 262, 102 N.W. 700, 701 (1905)). 
Similarly, "[t]o be frivolous it must appear so incontrovertibly from the mere reading or bare 
statement. If an argument is required to show that the pleading is bad, it is not frivolous." 
United States v. Aho, 51 F. Supp. 137, 139 (1943) (quoting The Victorian, 24 Or. 121, 137, 32 
P. 1040, 1044 (1893)). Thus, the term "nonfrivolous" assumes a very minimal showing. See, 
e.g., United States v. Beachner Constr. Co., 555 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (D. Kan. 1983) (implying 
that defendant raised a prima facie nonftjvolous claim where "offenses charged in both indict-
ments had the same common objective and several of the same participants"). 
365 
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charged are not the same. 6 
The issue often arises in cases in which a defendant has been 
charged with a narcotics7 or price fixing8 violation and with conspir-
6. Federal courts considering the burden of proof issue in double jeopardy cases have not 
clearly distinguished between the burden's two components, the burden of producing evidence 
and the burden of persuasion. "The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the 
liability to an adverse ruling . . . if evidence on the issue has not been produced. It is usually 
cast first upon the party who has pleaded the existence of the fact • . • ." C. McCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 784 (2d ed. 1972). In contrast, the burden of persua-
sion deals with whether the evidence presented is required to convince the trier of fact beyond 
a reasonable doubt, by clear and convincing evidence, or by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See id at 793. 
The courts have apparently equated a prima facie nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim with 
the burden of producing evidence. Once the defendant has made this preliminary showing, 
the burden of persuasion shifts to the government, which must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the crimes charged are not the same in law and fact. See, e.g., United States 
v. Kalish, 690 F.2d 1144, 1147 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant has the burden to tender prima facie 
nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim, after which the government has the burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the indictments charge different crimes), cert. denied, 103 
S. Ct. 735 (1983); United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.) ("the district court 
must determine whether a defendant has tendered a prima facie nonfrivolous double jeopardy 
claim before shifting the burden of persuasion to the Government"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 926 
(1980); United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.) (when defendant makes a 
nonfrivolous showing, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
there were in fact separate offenses before the defendant may be subjected to trial), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1977) (same); 
United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 821 (2d Cir.) ("once a defendant introduces sufficient 
evidence that the two conspiracies alleged were in fact one, the burden shifts to the govern-
ment to rebut the inference of unity"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. 
Beachner Constr. Co., 555 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (D. Kan. 1983) (when the threshold require-
ment of advancing a nonfrivolous claim is met, the burden shifts to the government to prove 
the existence of multiple conspiracies by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. 
Rivera, 465 F. Supp. 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Only when the defendant has introduced evidence 
sufficient to demonstrate that the conspiracies were in fact one, does the burden shift to the 
government to rebut the inference of unity."), ajfd without published opinion sub nom. United 
States v. Ramirez, 614 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1979); cf. United States v. Bendis, 681 F.2d 561, 564 
(9th Cir. 1981), (as an evidentiary concept, the burden of persuasion always lies with the de-
fendant on a double jeopardy claim; but the government's burden of responding to a defend-
ant's claim by going forward with the evidence may amount to a burden of persuasion), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 306 (1982). 
In cases where only a minimal showing is required to establish that the defendant's claim is 
"non-frivolous," see note 5 supra, this Note does not dispute the courts' characterization of the 
burden of proof. But where the courts contemplate more extensive showings as a prerequisite 
to satisfying the burden of producing evidence, this Note argues that both elements of the 
burden of proof should lie with the government. In Stricklin, for example, the court suggested 
that the defendant, in order to establish his case, "might find it necessary to offer his own 
testimony at the pretrial hearing." 591 F.2d at 1118. This Note concludes that this type of 
evidentiary burden is constitutionally and practically suspect. See notes 31-85 infra and ac-
companying text. Thus, the burden of proof - whether characterized as a burden of produc-
ing evidence or as a burden of persuasion - should fall on the government once the defendant 
has made a minimal showing that a trial for a second charged offense would subject him to 
double jeopardy. For convenience, the Note describes the defendant's minimal burden in 
terms of "shifting the burden of proof' to the government. 
1. See, e.g., United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977). In Inmon, two indict-
ments were returned ag~t the defendant on the same day. The first charged that Inmon 
conspired with nine codefendants and other unindicted and some unnamed co-conspirators to 
distribute and possess, with intent to distribute, heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) 
(1976). The second charged that he conspired with seventeen codefendants and other 
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acy to violate the law involved. Later, the government enters a sec-
ond substantive charge and a second conspiracy charge. The 
defendant then contests the second conspiracy charge by claiming 
former jeopardy, arguing that the violations alleged were part of the 
originally charged conspiracy. Since determination of the conspir-
acy's scope is a mixed question oflaw and fact,9 the question of who 
will bear the burden of proof is important. 
This Note argues that once the defendant raises a nonfrivolous 
double jeopardy claim that turns on a question of fact, the govern-
ment should have the burden of proving that the two crimes charged 
are actually different. Part I traces the development of the law and 
the major factors behind recent federal court scrutiny of the tradi-
tional rule. Part II argues that constitutional considerations require 
courts to shift the burden of proof to the government, not only when 
practical considerations suggest the shift, but in all cases turning on 
questions of fact. Finally, Part III reconciles this allocation with the 
well-established criminal collateral estoppel rule that requires the 
defendant to show identity of the relevant issues. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 
The double jeopardy clause serves several purposes. 10 It protects 
unindicted and some unnamed co-conspirators to violate the same statute. The first conspiracy 
allegedly continued from September 1, 1975 to April 4, 1976 and the second from February 1, 
1975 to July 14, 1976, the date the indictment was returned. While Inmon was the only defend-
ant charged in both indictments, the unindicted co-conspirators constituted an additional over-
lap. Inmon pleaded guilty to the first conspiracy charge and to the substantive charge. He later 
moved to dismiss the second indictment on the ground that his guilty plea to the first had put 
him in former jeopardy. 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Inryco, Inc. 1981-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,164,244 (D. Md. 
1981). In Inryco, VSL Corporation, three other corporations and two individuals were 
charged in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland with conspiracy to 
restrain trade in the post-tensioning (reinforcement of structural concrete) industry in the East-
ern states from April 1977, to May 1978. Four additional indictments in the California, Colo-
rado and Florida districts charged VSL with conspiring to restrain trade in post-tensioning on 
the construction of highways in the southwest from 1970 to December 1974, commercial struc-
tures in the southwest from May 1974, through 1976, commercial structures in the Rocky 
Mountain states, and commercial structures in Florida. After jeopardy attached in both the 
California cases and in the Florida case, VSL filed a motion in the Maryland district alleging 
that all the activities charged in the various indictments arose out of a single national conspir-
acy rather than independent regional conspiracies and that the Maryland indictment violated 
the double jeopardy clause. 
9. The question may involve the definition ~f conspiracy, as well as legal precedents con-
cerning the scope of conspiracy in terms of time or participants. However, the application of 
these legal issues will involve factual questions, and the burden of proof as to the factual 
elements will be important to the overall question. 
10. See, e.g., Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 449, 454 (1977) (stat-
ing that "the double jeopardy clause now serves a variety of important functions"); Westen & 
Drube!, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 84 (commenting 
on the Supreme Court's inability to determine the ''heart" of double jeopardy: ''The 'heart' of 
double jeopardy is sometimes identified as the ban on reprosecution following conviction; in 
other cases it is said to be the ban on reprosecution following acquittal.") (footnotes omitted). 
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defendants previously found guilty of an offense from being pun-
ished again for the same offense, 11 while protecting defendants pre-
viously found innocent from "repeated attempts [by the state] to 
convict. . . . enhancing the possibility that even though innocent 
[they] may be found guilty."12 The clause also "protects interests 
wholly unrelated to the propriety of any subsequent conviction."13 
The protection ensures the individual that "he will not be 
forced. . . . to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, 
and expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same of-
fense." 14 The double jeopardy clause is thus properly invoked 
whenever a defendant is prosecuted for an offense identical in fact 
and in law to an offense with which he was previously charged.15 
Before 1977, most courts16 placed the burden of proving a double 
jeopardy claim on the defendant.17 Because double jeopardy claims 
11. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (the double jeopardy 
clause "protects [a defendant] against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction"). 
12. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
13. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977). 
14. 431 U.S. at 661. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1966); United States v. Castro, 
629 F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1980); Chambers v. Wyrick, 539 F.2d 667, 668 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977); Dryden v. United States, 403 F.2d 1008, 1009 (5th Cir. 1968); 
State v. Freeman, 162 N.C. 491, 493, 77 S.E. 780, 782 (1913). The courts have used various 
methods to determine whether two offenses are the same in fact and in law. See, e.g., Note, 
Twice in Jeopardy, 15 YALE L.J. 262, 269-77 (1965). 
16. The exception was the Second Circuit. In United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971 (2d 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975), the court held that the facts presented were "suffi-
cient to satisfy [defendant's] burden of going forward, of putting his double jeopardy rights at 
issue ... [and] the burden shifts to the government to rebut the presumption." 503 F.2d al 
986. The court was, however, somewhat indefinite in placing the burden on the government. 
The court stated that ''where the offense charged is conspiracy to violate federal law other than 
the narcotics laws, . . . the defendant will bear a higher burden of proving that his double 
jeopardy right has been abridged." 503 F.2d at 987. Several courts have suggested that Mal-
/ah applies only to narcotics conspiracy cases. See, e.g., United States v. Tercero, 580 F,2d 
312, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820-21 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Price, 533 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), 
Nevertheless, other courts have cited Mal/ah as authority for shifting the burden to the govern• 
ment when the defendant raises a nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim. See, e.g., United States 
v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 1980) ( Fairchild, C.J., concurring); United States v. 
Parker, 582 F.2d 953, 954 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. 
Tercero, 580 F.2d 312,315 n.12 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 331-32 
(3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 821 (2d Cir. 1976). 
17. The rule is found in the federal circuits at least as early as Kastel v. United States, 23 
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1927), where the court derived authority from earlier state court rulings. See 
Barber v. State, 151 Ala: 56, 43 So. 808 (1907); Storm v. Territory, 12 Ariz. 109, 99 P. 275, ajfd 
170 F. 423 (9th Cir. 1909); Jacobs v. State, 100 Ark. 591, 141 S.W. 489 (1911); Harlan v. State, 
190 Ind. 322, 130 N.E. 413 (1921); Commonwealth v. Wermouth, 174 Mass. 74, 54 N.E. 352 
(1899); Price v. State, 104 Miss. 288, 61 So. 314 (1913); State v. Ackerman, 64 N.J.L. 99, 45 A. 
27 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1899); Territory v. West, 14 N.M. 546, 99 P. 343 (1908); State v. Williams, 43 
Wash. 505, 86 P. 847 (1906); cf. note 30 infra (citing recent state court cases). 
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were often reviewable only after a trial on the merits, 18 the defend-
ant could use the records of the two trials to show that both involved 
the same factual and legal offense.19 Thus, the· burden of proof did 
not prevent the defendant from securing what was at the time the 
full protection of the double jeopardy clause. 
In 1977, however, Abney v. United States20 broadened the scope 
of the clause's protection by altering the point at which a double 
jeopardy claim could be reviewed. The Supreme Court reasoned 
that the double jeopardy clause "assures an individual that . . . he 
will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the personal 
strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more 
than once for the same offense.''21 The Court therefore held that pre-
trial orders rejecting double jeopardy claims are final decisions that 
can be reviewed before exposure to a second trial.22 Although "Ab-
ney may be applied without serious complexity where the indict-
ments and the record from the previous trial are sufficiently explicit 
to provide for clear-cut determination of the double jeopardy 
claim"23 more difficult claims must be resolved by a pretrial hear-
ing. 24 If a defendant asserts the right defined in Abney by making a 
double jeopardy claim before undergoing a second trial, he will no 
longer be able to prove his claim by relying on the records developed 
at both trials. In order to carry the burden of proof, the defendant 
would have to introduce other evidence to show that the potential 
second trial would be factually and legally identical to the first. 
Under these circumstances, the defendant who attempts to raise a 
double jeopardy claim before a second trial may face what is, as a 
practical matter, an impossible task.25 Thus, improper allocation of 
the burden of proof may undermine the constitutional right identi-
fied by the Supreme Court inAbney.26 
18. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 
(1979). ' . 
19. 591 F.2d at 1124. 
20. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
21. 431 U.S. at 661; see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
22. 431 U.S. at 662. The Court reasoned that the guarantee against being subjected to a 
second trial would be lost if the defendant could appeal an adverse ruling only after the second 
trial had concluded. 431 U.S. at 661-62. 
23. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 
(1979). 
24. See United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.) ("It is necessary ... to 
establish procedural rules for an Abney pretrial double jeopardy hearing .... "), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 963 (1979); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[T]here must 
be a pretrial proceeding in which an appropriate record may be made to test a double jeopardy 
claim ...• "). 
25. See notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text. 
26. If the defendant raises a meritorious double jeopardy claim but is unable as a practical 
matter to prove it, see notes 31-85 infra and accompanying text, the burden of proof will have 
effectively undermined his constitutional rights: "[E]ven if the accused is acquitted, or, if con-
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Ultimately, the rule that places the burden of proving a double 
jeopardy claim on the defendant raises significant constitutional 
and practical difficulties.27 These problems have led some courts to 
shift the burden of persuasion to the government in double jeopardy 
claims turning on questions of fact.28 Other federal29 and state30 
victed, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still been 
forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit." Abney, 
431 U.S. at 662 (footnote omitted); see also notes 39-56 infra and accompanying text. 
27. See notes 39-85 infra and accompanying text. 
28. Since Abney, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have shifted from adherence to the tradi-
tional rule and placed the burden on the Government. In United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 
1112, 1118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979), the Fifth Circuit, citing United States v. 
Mallah, 503 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975), and United States v. 
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977), held that ''the burden of establishing that the indictments 
charge separate crimes is most equitably placed on the government when a defendant has 
made a nonfrivolous showing that an indictment charges the same offenses as that for which he 
was formerly placed in jeopardy." The court adhered to this rule in four later cases. United 
States v. Kalish, 690 F.2d 1144, 1147 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 735 (1983); United States 
v. Futch, 637 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); United States v. Tammaro, 636 F.2d 100, 
103 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
447 U.S. 926 (1980). The Sixth Circuit has also adopted the rule that the burden of proof shifts 
to the government after the defendant raises a nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim. United 
States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1981). 
The First, Third and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the new rule in cases of first impres-
sion. See United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 978 
(1982); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381, 1387 n.7 (11th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Venable, 585 F.2d 71, 74 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 331-32 (3d 
Cir. 1977). 
The status of the burden of proof is not clear in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals placed the burden on the defendant in Chambers v. Wyrick, 539 F.2d 
667, 668 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977), but in United States v. Tercero, 580 
F.2d 312, 315 n.12 (8th Cir. 1978), the court cited United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976), and United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975), for the rule that the burden shifts to the government. 
The rule appears only in a footnote to the Tercero decision, because the district court had not 
reached the issue of the burden of proof. As dictum, this citation indicates the direction in 
which the court is moving but would not be binding as precedent. The Ninth Circuit's position 
appears to be changing, but it is not completely clear where the burden now lies. Through 
1980 the burden was placed on the defendant. See United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 876 
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844 (1981). In United States v. Bendis, 681 F.2d 561, 564 
(9th Cir. 1981), the court adhered to its earlier position that ''the burden of persuasion gener-
ally does not shift and would appear to rest always with the defendant on a double jeopardy 
claim." However, the court considered opinions from other circuits and modified its position 
somewhat. It agreed that once the defendant made a nonfrivolous showing of former jeop-
ardy, the government would be required to tender evidence indicating separate offenses. It 
went on to state, however, that while the government's burden might in practical effect amount 
to a burden of persuasion, it is "more properly characterized as a burden to go forward with 
the evidence." 681 F.2d at 564. 
29. In United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456,461 (7th Cir. 1980), the Seventh Circuit ad-
hered to the traditional rule and placed the burden on the defendant, although a concurring 
opinion argued that the burden should shift to the state after a sufficient showing by the de-
fendant. 629 F.2d at 466 (Fairchild, CJ., concurring). More recently, the Seventh Circuit has 
again held that that the burden rests upon the defendant. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 
681 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1124, 1139 (1982). 
The Tenth Circuit has consistently held that the defendant has the burden of proving his 
double jeopardy claim. See United States v. Pluckett, 692 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 579 (1982) and 103 S. Ct. 1276 (1983); United States v. Eggert, 624 F.2d 973, 
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courts have retained the traditional allocation of the burden of 
proof. Part II will evaluate the practical and constitutional ratio-
nales that justify this shift. 
II. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR SHIFTING THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE GOVERNMENT 
Both practical and constitutional considerations mandate that the 
burden of proof in double jeopardy claims be shifted to the govern-
ment. Taken alone, practical reasons justify this shift only in those 
instances in which practical problems actually exist. Constitutional 
considerations, however, compel the conclusion that the burden of 
proof should be shifted to the government in all cases in which the 
resolution of a nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim turns on a ques-
tion of fact. 
A. Practical Bases 
The procedural shift to pretrial appeals embodied in Abney v. 
United States31 figures prominently in the reasoning of those courts 
that have shifted the burden of proof to the government. If the de-
fendant wishes to raise his double jeopardy claim before the record 
has been developed at a second trial, he may be unable to carry the 
requisite burden. Therefore, he will not be able to assert effectively 
his right to avoid a second trial for the same offense. In particular, 
courts question the ability of defendants to prove that the two 
charges are in fact for the same crime ''without access to the proof on 
which the government propose[s] to rely."32 This is particularly true 
when the government has exclusive access to materials that might 
determine the outcome of the defendant's claim.33 Some courts also 
975 (10th Cir. 1980): United States v. Wilshire Oil Co., 427 F.2d 969, 976 n.12 (10th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970). 
The issue has not been reached in the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Inryco, Inc., 1981-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,244 at 74,007 (D. Md. 1981), and there appear to be no cases on the 
issue in the-District of Columbia Circuit. 
30. State courts have generally placed the burden on the defendant, both before and after 
Abney. See, e.g., Sawyers v. State, 168 Ind. App. 149, 341 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Ind. App. 1976); 
Beard v. State, 164 Ind. App. 205, 327 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 388 Mass. 865,868,448 N.E.2d 759, 762 (1983); State v. Moller, 276 Minn. 185, 187, 
149 N.W.2d 274, 276 (1967); State v. Glover, 500 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Mo. App. 1973); State v. 
Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334,343, 180.S.E.2d 745, 751 (1971); State v. Heinz, 119 N.H. 717,720,407 
A.2d 814, 816 (1979); Shaffer v. State, 477 S.W.2d 873, 877 (fex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. 
Ridgley, 70 Wash. 2d 555,557,424 P.2d 632, 633 (1967); see also state cases cited in note 17 
supra. But see State v. Lee, 210 Kan. 753, 756, 504 P.2d 202,205 (1972). 
31. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
32. United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 1977); see also United States v. 
Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1118 
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). 
33. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1124 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
963 (1979). 
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noted, among other things, that it was "impractical" to place the bur-
den on the defendant because of the defendant's inability to offer 
immunity to witnesses.34 Absent the power to offer immunity, de-
fendants could encounter serious difficulties in obtaining testimony 
needed to demonstrate the identity of the new and old charges. Be-
cause the government's control over the particularity of the indict-
ment renders the government responsible for the practical difficulties 
confronting the defendant, some courts have concluded that the gov-
ernment ought to bear the burden of proving the issue raised by the 
indictment's imprecision.35 
Because the courts have based this shift largely on practical con-
siderations, it has been narrowly interpreted. In United States v. 
Rumpf,36 the Tenth Circuit held that Abney did not require that the 
burden be lifted from the defendant but recognized that it might 
shift under circumstances in which proof was in the control of the 
prosecution or could be established only by the use of government 
witnesses. 37 The court treated the same factors that led other courts 
to shift the burden to the government as unusual circumstances that 
might require an ad hoc solution, but not a new rule. Even in cir-
cuits where the burden has been shifted to the government, the scope 
of the shift has often been limited to those cases in which practical 
difficulties warranted it.38 Although practical considerations and un-
usual circumstances will justify a shift only in particular cases, con-
stitutional concerns compel more sweeping change. 
B. Constitutional Considerations 
I. Procedural Choices and the Burden of Proof 
The Supreme Court inAbney v. United States39 showed its will-
ingness to tailor procedure to protect the rights that the double jeop-
34. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
963 (1979); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1977). 
35. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
963 (1979); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1977). This is particularly true 
in narcotics conspiracy cases, where the government can carve one large conspiracy into sev-
eral smaller crimes by choosing one set of overt actions in one indictment and a different set in 
another. See United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 191B);see also United States v. 
Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Mallah, 503 
F.2d 971, 987 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975); United States v. Price, 533 F. 
Supp. 1183, I 187 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
36. 576 F.2d 818 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978). 
37. 576 F.2d at 823. 
38. See United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); 
United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 987 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975); 
United States v. Price, 533 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that the rule was 
modified due to the unique structure of a narcotics conspiracy). 
39. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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ardy clause confers upon a criminal defendant. The issue was 
whether a pretrial denial of a double jeopardy claim was a final deci-
sion appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.40 The Court held that 
the clause was more than a guarantee against double punishment. It 
was also a guarantee against being tried twice for the same offense.41 
Based on that conclusion, the Court held that "if a criminal defend-
ant is to ... enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his double jeop-
ardy challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before . . . 
subsequent exposure occurs."42 
Although the Court in Abney defined procedure in a way that 
protected the criminal defendant against double jeopardy, it did not 
explain how far it was willing to go in quest of that protection. Of 
course, not all procedure must be structured so as to maximize con-
stitutional protections. If such a requirement did exist, courts would 
always allocate the burden of proof in a manner that favored the 
party for whose benefit the protection was being invoked. However, 
the protected party often bears the burden of proving facts requisite 
to his constitutional claim.43 Of course, the Court has also secured 
certain constitutional rights by placing the burden of proof on the 
government,44 but a criterion for selecting required levels of protec-
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) ("The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction from alljinal 
decisions of the district courts of the United States .... ") (emphasis added);seeAhn~, 431 
U.S. at 656-62. 
41. 431 U.S. at 660-61. 
42. 431 U.S. at 662. 
43. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2494 (1982) (no presumption of 
due process violation through prosecutorial vindictiveness); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
226 (1965) (burden on defendant to show abuse of the jury selection process); Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (burden of proof on property owner to show a 
taking). 
44. The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed the custo-
dial interrogation of an arrestee who had no counsel present. The Court stated that "[i]f the 
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy 
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly md intelligently 
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counseL" 
384 U.S. at 475; see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (stating that "the prosecu-
tion must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was volun-
tary"). 
Similarly, the burden of proof lies with the government in the context of warrantless 
searches. ''When the prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a 
search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily 
given." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (citing Wren v. United States, 
352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965)); Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1965); Judd v. 
United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir 1951); Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 
1931). 
The court has also placed the burden of proof on the government in order to protect a 
defendant's sixth amendment right to counseL Where that right is violated by the absence of 
counsel at a post-indictment lineup, the government has the burden of proving that in-court 
identifications were not based on the lineup identification. See United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 239-40 (1967). 
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tion must be developed before one can conclude that that the guar-
antee against double jeopardy falls within this category. 
Although the Court has never articulated such a criterion, Abney 
suggests one: A constitutional protection should not be defeated by 
the procedure required to invoke it.45 In holding that a denial of a 
double jeopardy claim could be appealed before trial, the Court 
noted that the guarantee against double jeopardy includes protection 
against a second trial. It concluded that this aspect of the guaran-
tee's protection ''would be lost if the accused were forced to 'run the 
gauntlet' a second time before an appeal could be taken . . . ."46 
Rather than allow the loss of that protection, the Court defined the 
procedure to insure that the defendant could invoke his constitu-
tional rights effectively. 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Hoffman v. United 
States, 41 which considered the proof required for a witness' claim 
against testimonial compulsion. The Court held that "if the witness, 
upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the 
sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, 
he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the 
privilege is designed to guarantee."48 Again, the Court indicated 
that it would not allow a constitutional protection to be undermined 
by the procedure required to invoke it.49 
45. Note that the cases cited at note 43 supra - in which the burden is on the protected 
party - do not violate the principle presented here. A property owner's burden in showing a 
taking does not itself defeat a property interest of the owner. Nor does the burden in showing 
prosecutorial vindictiveness increase vindictiveness or otherwise directly damage the defend-
ant's interest in a fair trial. Lastly, the burden of showing abuse in jury selection does not itself 
lead to a biased jury. 
46. 431 U.S. at 662. 
47. 341 U.S. 479 (1951). 
48. 341 U.S. at 486. 
49. Several other areas of procedure exemplify the rule without stating it. One such area is 
the procedure for contesting personal jurisdiction. A defendant wishing to contest jurisdiction 
in a civil case could be forced to do so in the very court whose jurisdiction he finds objectiona-
ble. Such a procedure would require a defendant to submit to a limited level of jurisdiction in 
order to exercise his right to contest jurisdiction. Rather than permitting procedure to defeat 
the protection, the courts allow a collateral attack. When judgment is sought in a second state, 
based on a default judgment in the state whose jurisdiction is contested, the courts of the 
second state determine the propriety of the first state's claim of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Adam v. 
Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62 (1938). . 
The principle is also exemplified by the procedure for obtaining a witness under compul-
sory process. Although a defendant may be required to show some particularized need for the 
witness and indicate the subject of the witness' testimony, the showing required cannot be too 
great. If too much information were required, compulsory process could never be obtained, 
because the defendant would need to obtain the witness in order to provide the required infor-
mation. Instead, the state "cannot require that a defendant provide greater detail than is rea-
sonable under the circumstances." Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L. REv. 191,276 
(1975). See generally Westen at 265-76. 
The court has also followed the rule in the welfare area. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254 (1970), the Supreme Court noted that those qualified to receive welfare benefits had a 
statutory entitlement to those benefits. If termination could be contested only at a post-termi-
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Among other things, the double jeopardy clause protects the de-
fendant from the "personal strain, public embarrassment and e~-
pense"50 that accompanies a second trial. Since Abney, the 
resolution of double jeopardy claims no longer requires a second 
trial. Rather, courts may now decide the double jeopardy issue at a 
pretrial hearing.51 If practical considerations like the government's 
superior access to relevant evidence52 would prevent a defendant 
from establishing an otherwise meritorious double jeopardy claim 
during the pretrial hearing,53 a procedural rule that forces him to 
bear the burden of proof will defeat his right to avoid a second trial 
for the same offense. A court should not allocate the burden of proof 
in a way that would undermine the constitutional protection identi-
fied in Abney. 54 
nation hearing, the procedure would defeat the entitlement "(T]ermination of aid pending 
resolution . . . may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he 
waits." 397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis in original). Rather than allow the procedure to defeat the 
entitlement, the court held that hearings must be held before benefits are terminated. 397 U.S. 
at 266. 
The principle has also been applied to the procedural rules of state courts. In Reece v. 
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955), the Court held that Georgia's procedure allowing only preindict-
ment challenges to the composition of a grand jury could not be allowed to defeat a defend-
ant's right to contest that composition. It has also been argued that in civil claims under 
federal law, state procedural rules so burdensome as to violate due process must be rejected. 
See Hill, The Inadequate Stale Ground, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 943, 971-80 (1965). 
50. Abneyv. United States, 431 U.S. 653,661 (1977); see also Serfass v. United States, 420 
U.S. 377, 391 (1975) ("When a criminal prosecution is terminated prior to trial, an accused is 
often spared much of the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment which attend a trial."). 
51. See note 24 supra and accompanying text 
52. See notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text 
53. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text. 
54. q. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Proce-
dure in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (A. Howard ed. 1965). Before Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), was decided, Professor Kamisar argued that the defendant's privilege 
against self-incrimination at trial required that the protection be extended to pretrial question-
ing. Custodial interrogation should not take place under conditions undermining the freedom 
to speak or not to speak. "One cannot but wonder how often the availability of the privilege 
. . ., once the accused reaches the safety and comfort of the mansion, only furnishes the State 
with an additional incentive for proving the charge against him out of his own mouth before 
he leaves the gatehouse [police station]." Id at 25. 
Later, the Supreme Court analyzed Miranda in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
''The (Miranda] Court recognized that these procedural safeguards [on custodial interrogation] 
were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure 
that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." 417 U.S. at 444; see also 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 7 (1970) (Presence of counsel at preliminary hearings is 
"necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right mean-
ingfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counzel 
at the trial itself."); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(''The right to have counsel at the pretrial stage is often necessary to give meaning and protec-
tion to the right to be heard at the trial itself."); In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (''The right to use counsel at the formal trial is a very hollow thing when, for all 
practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination."). Compare 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (''The presence of counsel at ... critical 
confrontations . . . operates to assure that the accused's interests will be protected consistently 
with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution."), with 388 U.S. at 228 (Scientific analyses 
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Moreover, pretrial hearings, like trials, involve personal strain, 
public embarrassment and expense, burdens that the double jeop-
ardy clause is designed to prevent. The fact that a pretrial plea of 
former jeopardy is an issue collateral to the criminal prosecution 
means that the double jeopardy clause does not preclude the burdens 
inherent in the pretrial hearing.55 Nevertheless, the clause ought to 
inform the allocation of the burden of proof; the burden imposed on 
defendant should not, if possible, duplicate the strain of a second 
trial. 
A rule that completely exempted the defendant from the pretrial 
hearing would be the simplest way to protect his right to avoid a 
second trial for the same offense, but it would be unreasonable to 
suggest that charges be dropped simply on the basis of a nonfrivo-
lous double jeopardy claim. A hearing must be held, but the burden 
of proof should be placed on the government; this alternative is the 
one that imposes the least restriction on the defendant's right.56 The 
"are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages 
might derogate from his right to a fair trial."). 
55. The pretrial hearing does not put the defendant in former jeopardy because it does not 
implicate the merits of the offense with which he is charged. The Supreme Court has empha-
sized that 
the very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable 
from, the principal issue at the accused's impending criminal trial, ie., whether or not the 
accused is guilty of the offense charged. In arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment bars his prosecution, the defendant makes no challenge whatsoever 
to the merits of the charge against him. Nor does he seek suppression of evidence which 
the Government plans to use in obtaining a conviction. Rather, he is contesting the very 
authority of the Government to hale him into court to face trial on the charge against 
him. . . . [T]he matters embraced in the trial court's pretrial order here are truly collat-
eral to the criminal prosecution itself in the sense that they will not "affect, or . . . be 
affected by, decision of the merits of this case." 
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1977) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan, 
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)) (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332 (3d 
Cir. 1977) ("As to the evidentiary burden, since the fifth amendment double jeopardy privilege 
is just that - a personal and waivable privilege - rather than an element of the crime, we 
think it inappropriate to require the government to prove the separateness of the offenses be-
yond a reasonable doubt"). 
56. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (a state's statute max.not "sweep 
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade an area of protected freedoms"); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (invalidated a state requirement because the state's goal could "be 
more narrowly achieved" and "must be viewed in light ofless drastic means for achieving the 
same basic purpose"); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (overturned a 
municipal ordinance affecting commerce because "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives 
... [were] available"); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (prior restraint disallowed 
since the less restrictive alternative of subsequent punishment under libel laws was available); 
Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Just!ftca-
tion, and Some Criteria, 21 V AND. L. RE.v. 971, 1036 (1974) ("[A] statute that intrudes upon an 
individual interest may be susceptible to constitutional attack if alternative means exist for 
accomplishing the state's purpose in a manner less restrictive of an individual interest."); Note, 
Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity ftom Committee Interro• 
gation, 65 YALE LJ. 1159, 1173 (1956) ("The policy against unnecessary governmental restric-
tion of First Amendment rights requires the courts to strike down restrictions unless they meet 
two requirements: they must be imposed for some substantial public purpose, and must be 
necessary for the purpose"); Id at 1174-75 ("[E]ven if the end is proper, Congress cannot 
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defendant will be required to present less evidence than he would if 
he had to carry the burden of proof. Indeed, if the burden is on the 
government, the defendant might not be required to make any show-
ing at all. If the government fails to prove its case, the defendant 
will prevail. This approach to allocating the burden of proof would 
minimize the risk that a defendant would be forced to undergo a 
second trial for the same offense, and it would also prevent the pre-
trial hearing itself from imposing an onerous burden on the 
defendant. 
2. Self-Incrimination 
Another rationale for placing the burden of proof on the govern-
ment lies in the possible conflict between placing the burden on the 
defendant and the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 
A defendant who has the burden of proof might deem it necessary to 
testify in order to demonstrate the identity of the relevant law and 
facts. The defendant's pretrial testimony in support of his double 
jeopardy claim may prove to be self-incriminating.57 If so, the de-
fendant has been forced to give up his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in order to assert his guarantee against double jeopardy. 
The problem here is similar to the one that appears when a de-
fendant is required to establish his standing to suppress illegally ob-
tained evidence by showing, at a pretrial hearing, his connection 
with the evidence. Clearly, a showing of this nature could be self-
incriminating. In Simmons v. United States, 58 the Supreme Court 
found it "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be 
surrendered in order to assert another."59 The Court recognized the 
problem but indicated that simply prohibiting use of the defendant's 
pretrial testimony at trial would solve the problem. 60 
pursue it by means that abridge First Amendment freedoms if the end could be substantially 
achieved without unreasonable difficulty by means that would abridge such freedom less."). 
51. See United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977). The court noted that if the 
double jeopardy burden were on the defendant, he ''would be required to prove facts _establish-
ing the charge of conspiracy to which he pleaded guilty and to prove facts establishing the 
second conspiracy as well." 568 F.2d at 329. The defendant would have to establish the exist-
ence of a larger agreement than those on which the conspiracy charges were based. He would 
have to prove one agreement encompassing all the individuals and activities involved. He 
would also have to show that the first conspiracy extended beyond the date charged and that 
the second began before the date charged. He would thereby make himself responsible for any 
acts done by co-conspirators in furtherence of the conspiracies during those increased 
timespans. · 
58. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
59. 390 U.S. at 394. 
60. 390 U.S. at 394. The Third Circuit considered the conflict in the double jeopardy con-
text in United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977), a case in which the court held that 
the government had the burden of proof. The court considered the possibility that, even with 
the burden on the government, a defendant might choose to testify at the double jeopardy 
hearing and held that he could ''not be required, as the cost oflitigating ... [his] fifth amend-
ment double jeopardy claim, to waive his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
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While the Court was willing to strike such a balance in a fourth 
amendment suppression hearing, the double jeopardy context is dis-
tinct and thus need not be governed by the same rule. In suppres-
sion hearings, complete deference to a defendant's fifth amendment 
rights would require a return to automatic standing, a doctrine dis-
carded by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sa/vucci.61 The 
automatic standing doctrine allowed a defendant to challenge the 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence relevant to a possessory 
offense without asserting his possessory interest in the seized ob-
ject.62 The Court concluded, however, that such a doctrine extends 
fourth amendment protection to defendants who have suffered no 
violation of their fourth amendment rights.63 Automatic standing 
improperly enhanced the likelihood· that these defendants would 
succeed on suppression motions and thus increased the probability 
that the charges would be dismissed. In the context of a double jeop-
ardy hearing, deference to the defendant's fifth amendment rights 
does not result in automatic extension of double jeopardy protection 
to defendants who do not merit such protection. To be sure, alloca-
tion of the burden of proof could affect the resolution of a double 
jeopardy claim. But an interest in avoiding the burden of proof is 
qualitatively different from an interest in preventing a ''windfall to 
defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been vio-
lated."64 Thus, the suppression context and the double jeopardy 
context are not parallel and do not require application of the same 
principle. 
In addition, the problems that arise as a result of the Simmons 
approach indicate that a different balance should be struck in the 
double jeopardy context. Simmons has been criticized as offering in-
adequate protection to the defendant's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, because it allows the defendant's testimony to be used for 
impeachment purposes.65 Even if this use were banned,66 some ques-
in a later trial." 568 F.2d at 333. As in Simmons, the Inmon court concluded that it could 
avoid the conflict by forbidding trial use of the defendant's pretrial testimony. Since the court 
had placed the burden on the government, it is not clear whether the court would'have consid-
ered forbidding the use of pretrial testimony in the absence of a shifted burden. 
61. 448 U.S. 83 (1980); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
62. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
63. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 95. 
64. 448 U.S. at 95 (emphasis in original). 
65. The dissenters in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 96 (1980), objected to overrul-
ing automatic standing to assert a fourth amendment violation, because they did not agree 
with the majority's claim that Simmons protected the defendant's fifth amendment rights. The 
testimony could still be used to impeach the defendant should he testify at trial to his lack of 
connection with the evidence he had sought to suppress. That problem would carry over to the 
double jeopardy context should the defendant testify at trial that the crimes charged in the 
indictments were distinct after having tried to prove that they were the same in order to invoke 
the protection of the double jeopardy clause. 
66. In Salvucci, the Court left open the possibility that impeachment use could be banned, 
448 U.S. at 94. 
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tion would remain as to whether the ban on either impeachment use 
or use in the prosecution's case would be effective. To be effective, 
the ban must not only prevent use of the defendant's testimony, but 
must also prevent the use of any evidence derived from that testi-
mony. 67 Weakness produced by exceptions68 to the derivative use 
doctrine may be particularly acute in the double jeopardy context. 
While derivative use immunity places a heavy burden on the govern-
ment to prove an independent source for the evidence offered at 
trial,69 a ban on derivative use in a double jeopardy hearing cannot 
be sufficiently guaranteed. The prosecution may gain from the de-
fendant's testimony an understanding of how the charged crime re-
lates to other crimes. This knowledge will not itself be offered as 
evidence. Thus, despite the fact that the defendant's testimony will 
have been very useful to the government, 70 it will be unprotected by 
the derivative use ban because its connection to the development of 
other evidence is likely to be viewed as tenuous.71 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant's testi-
mony at the pretrial hearing would be completely protected, the bal-
67. Only the combination of "immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the 
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 
(1972) (emphasis added). Although Kastigar discusses the protection that is required before 
the government can compel testimony by an immunized witness claiming the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the scope of the protection should be no narrower when the defendant's 
privilege is being protected. See also United States v. Bounos, 693 F.2d 38, 40 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that use and derivative use immunity is all that is required for the protection of 
defendants testifying at a double jeopardy hearing). 
68. An independent source exception developed in "fruits of the poisonous tree" cases. In 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the case in which the "fruits" 
doctrine was unveiled, the Court noted that information obtained in two distinct manners, 
only one of which was illegal, could be used. 
Some lower courts have extended the exception to cases in which the prosecution can show 
that the evidence or information would inevitably have been discovered through usual investi-
gatory techniques. See, e.g., United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 975 (1981); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 
1980). The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this extension but has stated in a footnote 
that "evidence of where the body was found ... might well be admissible on the theory that 
the body would have been discovered in any event .... " Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
406-07 n.12 (1977) (emphasis added). 
The independent source rule "should not be permitted to emasculate the exculsionary 
rule." Pitier, "The Fmit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 
579, 627 (1968). Although the inevitable discovery extension "has a certain appeal, ... it 
collides with the fundamental purpose of the exculsionary rule. The ability of police scientists, 
laboratory technicians, and investigators to discover, analyze, and develop substantial leads 
from minute materials appears to make even the most implausible discovery virtually inevita-
ble." Id. at 630. 
69. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972). 
10. Cf. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449,460 (1975) (recognizing that it is not always possi-
ble to " 'unring the bell' once the information has been released."). 
71. The doctrine of attenuation holds that the taint on the evidence dissipates when the 
causal connection between the illegal activity and the information obtained becomes tenuous. 
Thus, the fruits of the illegal conduct may be used. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
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ance struck in Simmons may still violate the defendant's privilege 
against self-incrimination. "The constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination has two primary interrelated facets: The Government 
may not use compulsion to elicit self-incriminating statements . . . 
and the Government may not permit the use in a criminal trial of 
self-incriminating statements elicited by compulsion."72 Although 
restrictions on use, derivative use, and impeachment use of def end-
ant's testimony may secure the second facet of the privilege, such 
restrictions do not protect the first. The privilege in its entirety is 
fulfilled "only when a person is guaranteed the right to 'remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own 
will.' " 73 Thus, the fifth amendment does more than guarantee that 
compelled testimony will not be used, directly or indirectly, against 
the accused. The fifth amendment also grants to the defendant a 
right not to be compelled to testify against himself.74 
One might argue that the defendant has not been compelled to 
give up his privilege against self-incrimination but has instead cho-
sen to testify in order to gain the benefit of his double jeopardy pro-
tection. However, "[when] the 'benefit' to be gained is that afforded 
by another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable tension is 
created."75 That tension may effectively compel the defendant to 
testify.76 
Even if the state's interests in fourth amendment suppression 
hearings are important enough to outweigh the defendant's interest 
in avoiding self-incrimination, the state's interest in the double jeop-
ardy context is less substantial.77 Moreover, the general criticism of 
the Simmons balance and the particular problems arising in double 
jeopardy claims78 require that a different balance be struck. The 
courts should minimize the defendant's compulsion to testify by re-
72. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964). 
73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
74. Greenwalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Righi, 23 WM, & MARY L. REV. 15, 
34-43 (1981), argues that even aside from the fifth amendment right an individual has a moral 
right to remain silent in the criminal process. 
75. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), 
76. Compulsion is impermissible even if it is not physical. The Supreme Court has found 
violations of the right against compelled testimony in the custodial interrogation of a suspect 
without counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court recognized the effec-
tiveness of psychological factors in producing confessions and expressed its disapproval of 
"friendly-unfriendly" or "Mutt and Jeff'' tactics, 384 U.S. at 452, and the interrogator "pa-
tiently maneuver[ing] himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective 
may be attained." 384 U.S. at 455 (quoting F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMI• 
NAL INTERROGATION 185 (3d ed. 1953)); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) 
(speech by a detective aimed at the conscience of an arrestee held to constitute compulsion), 
The Supreme Court has also held, in New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), that immu-
nized testimony before a grand jury is coerced testimony. 
77. See text at note 61 supra. 
78. See text at note 65-76 supra. 
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quiring the government to bear the burden of proof when the de-
fendant raises a nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim. 
3. Prosecution Discovery 
Even if the defendant does not testify, requiring him to bear the 
burden of proof causes problems. To carry this burden, the defend-
ant must do more than simply refute the government's evidence. He 
must offer evidence on the factual issues involved and show that the 
two crimes charged are legally and factually identical. Such a re-
quirement permits the prosecution to discover the defendant's case 
in chief.79 This discovery is not an opportunity that the prosecutor 
would normally have.80 
Placing the defendant in a position where he must reveal any 
part of his defense conflicts with his constitutional rights. "Indeed, it 
has been traditionally supposed that discovery by a prosecutor in a 
criminal case would constitute a plain violation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination."81 This is not to say that courts will never 
allow prosecution discovery; it does, however, indicate that special 
circumstances will be required before discovery is permitted. 
The Supreme Court identified these special circumstances in Wil-
liams v. Florida, 82 which upheld a Florida rule that a defendant must 
provide notice of any alibi that he plans to offer at trial. The Court 
recognized that even this limited discovery created a compelled testi-
mony problem, but nevertheless upheld the rule because it "only 
compelled [the defendant] to accelerate the timing of his disclo-
sure .... [T]he Fifth Amendment privilege [does not entitle] a de-
fendant . . . to await the end of the State's case before announcing 
the nature of his defense."83 Permissible discovery is designed to 
eliminate surprise exculpatory evidence84 and is limited ''to material 
19. See 3 A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 252 
(1978), where defense counsel are warned to draft carefully motions to suppress evidence so as 
not to disclose factual theories of the defense that underlie the motions. It is feared that the 
police, in their desire to sustain arrests, searches and confessions, will conform their testimony 
to fit whatever theory will validate their conduct. A similar concern should arise when the 
prosecution is in a position to structure its case in chief based on what was learned of the 
defendant's theories at a pretrial hearing on a double jeopardy claim. 
80. "Rule 16, the general discovery provision [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure], applies only to defendants." In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12, 15 (2d 
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 902 (1963); see also United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 
202 (D.D.C. 1965) ("[T]he Government may not bring a parallel civil proceeding and avail 
itself of civil discovery devices to obtain evidence for subsequent criminal prosecution."). 
81. AMSTERDAM, supra note 79, at§ 274. 
82. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
83. 399 U.S. at 85. 
84. See United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that permissi-
ble discovery rules are those intended to eliminate surprise regarding exculpatory evidence, 
not to force the production of incriminating evidence). 
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that the defendant intends to produce at trial."85 
The information that is discoverable under the Williams rule dif-
fers from that which can be obtained fiom the defendant's testimony 
in a double jeopardy hearing. In that situation, the nature of the 
defense is known to the prosecution - the defendant js claiming that 
the double jeopardy clause bars a second trial. Moreover, in the 
course of substantiating this objection, the defendant may be forced 
to produce facts and reveal theories that he might never have offered 
at trial. Courts should protect the defendant from prosecutorial dis-
covery, minimizing his evidentiary production by placing the burden 
of proof on the government. 
C. Scope of the Proposed Rule 
There are, then, several constitutional and practical bases from 
which to argue that the burden of proof in a double jeopardy claim 
should be on the government. The practical bases run to certain sit-
uations in which defendants would be unable to carry the burden of 
proof even if they deserved to prevail on their claims. Based solely 
upon the practical bases, the scope of the rule shifting the burden of 
proof would be limited to cases in which practical problems actually 
make it difficult for the defendant to carry the burden. 
The constitutional bases stand beside and strengthen the access 
to proof rationale offered by the courts that have shifted the burden 
to the government. These bases, however, do not have the same lim-
its as the practical considerations. Because they are not grounded on 
the unique problems inherent in conspiracies, the constitutional ba-
ses mandate a rule that the burden of proof should be on the govern-
ment for all double jeopardy claims turning on a question of fact.86 
Ill. DISTINGUISHING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
An issue related to double jeopardy is collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion. 87 Under this principle, when an issue of ultimate fact88 
85. AMSTERDAM, supra note 79, at§ 274 (basing the claim on Williams and Jones v. Supe-
rior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962)); see also United States v. 
Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("[f)he Government may discover (when it 
may discover at all) only . . . evidence 'which the defendant intends to produce at trial,' "). 
86. Because the fifth amendment has been incorporated against the states, see Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), a shift based on constitutional imperatives would also alter the 
allocation of the burden in state prosecutions. 
87. The phrases "collateral estoppel" and "issue preclusion" are interchangeable. See F. 
JAMES & G. liAzARD, CML PROCEDURE 563 (2d ed. 1977) ("This ... effect of a judgment 
was called 'collateral estoppel' and is now called 'issue preclusion.'"). 
88. In The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d. Cir. 1944), Judge Learned Hand 
explained the difference between ultimate facts and mediate or evidentiary facts: 
[A) "fact" may be of two kinds. It may be one of those facts, upon whose combined 
occurrence the law raises the duty, or the right, in question; or it may be a fact, from 
whose existence may be rationally inferred the existence of one of the facts upon whose 
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has been determined by a valid and final judgment, it cannot be re-
litigated by the same parties in a future action.89 Although the prin-
ciple was first developed in civil litigation,90 the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Oppenheimer91 held that the principle also applied 
to criminal actions.92 Since then, the Court has elevated the protec-
tion to a constitutional level, holding inAshe v. Swenson 93 that col-
lateral estoppel is covered by the double jeopardy clause.94 
In civil litigation, the burden of proof in collateral estoppel is 
clearly on the party that asserts the principle.95 The expansion of the 
doctrine to the criminal arena brought with it the burden of proof 
rule.96 Because the burden of proof in criminal collateral estoppel 
lies with the defendant and because the collateral estoppel claim is 
analogous to a defendant's claim of double jeopardy,97 the argument 
that the government should bear the burden of proof as to double 
jeopardy is enhanced by any distinction that may be drawn between 
combined occurrence the law raises the duty, or the right. The first kind of fact we shall 
for convenience call an "ultimate" fact; the second, a "mediate datum." "Ultimate" facts 
are those which the law makes the occasion for imposing its sanctions. 
Elsewhere it has been explained that ultimate facts are facts essential to the court's decision. 
People ex rel Hudson & M.R. Co. v. Sexton, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 884, 885 (1944). 
89. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). 
90. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). 
91. 242 U.S. 85 (1916). 
92. Justice Holmes stated that "[i]t cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often 
and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liabil-
ity in debt." 242 U.S. at 87. 
93. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Ashe was charged with and tried for robbing one of six poker 
players, all of whom had been robbed at the same time by a group of three or four men. The 
jury found the evidence presented by the prosecutor insufficient and the defendant not guilty. 
He was then charged with the robbery of another of the poker players and was convicted. The 
court held that since the jury in the first trial had determined that Ashe had not been one of the 
robbers, the issue could not be relitigated. 
94. 397 U.S. at 445. For discussions of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy see Note, 
Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262 (1965); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and 
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HAR.v. L. REv. 1 (1960). 
95. See 1B J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.408[1] at 
293 (2d ed. 1983) (finding authority in a line of civil cases stretching back to 1876). 
96. See, e.g., United States v. Giarrantano, 622 F.2d 153, 156 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Clark, 613 F.2d 391, 400 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); United 
States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United 
States v. Davis, 460 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1972); Moore v. United States, 460 F.2d 558, 559-
60 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
97. It has been argued that only a defendant may invoke collateral estoppel in criminal 
cases. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Ashe v. Swenson, stated that "courts that have ap-
plied the collateral-estoppel concept to criminal actions would certainly not apply it to both 
parties .... " 397 U.S. at 464-65 (emphasis in original). Since Ashe v. Swenson, however, 
several courts have applied collateral estoppel to criminal defendants. See, e.g., Hernandez-
Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1 
(9th Cir. 1975); People v. Ford, 65 Cal. 2d 41, 416 P.2d 132, 52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1018 (1967); Carmody v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court, 81 Nev. 83, 398 P.2d 
706 (1965). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of whether the use of collateral 
estoppel against a defendant is constitutional. Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecu-
tions, 65 IowA L. REv. 281, 314 (1980). 
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the two principles.9s 
A. Distinguishing Collateral Estoppel From Double Jeopardy 
The Court in Ashe v. Swenson 99 was concerned that changes in 
criminal law and judicial interpretation were eroding the protection 
afforded by the guarantee against double jeopardy.100 The Court 
sought to stem that erosion by including collateral estoppel within 
the guarantee against double jeopardy. IOI The elevation of collateral 
estoppel to a constitutional level was based not on a desire to provide 
an additional constitutional right, but rather to protect an already 
existing one.102 The court had earlier declined to rule that collateral 
estoppel was itself a guarantee constitutionally mandated by due 
process.103 Its use as a means of furthering another constitutional 
guarantee leaves open the possibility that the procedural protections 
afforded by collateral estoppel are less extensive than those afforded 
by the double jeopardy clause itself. 
Indeed, differences in the approaches used to examine collateral 
estoppel and double jeopardy claims suggest differences in the proce-
dural protections required by each. In considering a claim of collat-
eral estoppel, the court must " 'examine the record of a prior 
98. Alternatively, one might contend that the burden of proof rule used in civil collateral 
estoppel should not have been applied when the principle expanded into criminal procedure. 
That argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
99. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
100. The Court noted that: 
at common law, and under early federal criminal statutes, offense categories were rela-
tively few and distinct. A single course of criminal conduct was likely to yield but a single 
offense. . . . In more recent times, with the advent of specificity in draftsmanship and the 
extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related statutory offenses, it became possi-
ble for prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numerous series of offenses from a single 
alleged criminal transaction. 
397 U.S. at 445 n.10. 
The "same offense" test, as presented in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), 
also served to erode the protection from double jeopardy. Only when the evidence required to 
convict on one offense was also sufficient to convict on another would the offenses be consid-
ered the same for double jeopardy purposes. 284 U.S. at 304. "Such a test can lead to an 
extremely restrictive application of the double jeopardy rule. Very few separate offenses aris-
ing in a given situation will require exactly the same evidence in order to convict the defend-
ant" Recent .Developments: Constitutional Law - .Double Jeopardy, 69 MICH. L. REV. 762, 
768 (1971). 
101. See 391 U.S. 445 n.10. 
102. The opinion inAshe v. Swenson continued to refer to collateral estoppel as a "rule of 
federal law" and held that it is embodied in the fifth amendment because the double jeopardy 
guarantee ''protects a man who has been acquitted from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second 
time." 397 U.S. at 445-46. The protection afforded by collateral estoppel would serve to fur-
ther that double jeopardy guarantee. 397 U.S. at 445 n.10. By holding that collateral estoppel 
was embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee, the states would be required to adopt the 
principle, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), and the double jeopardy guarantee 
would be strengthened. Had collateral estoppel remained merely a rule of federal procedure, 
it would not have been binding on state courts. 
103. See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958). 
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proceeding, talcing into account the pleadings, evidence, charge and 
other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could 
have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the 
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.' " 104 The court 
must examine only the pleadings in the second trial. 105 The limited 
scope of this inquiry distinguishes collateral estoppel from double 
jeopardy proceedings turning upon questions of fact, where both the 
prior proceeding and the facts relevant to the second crime charged 
must be examined.106 This distinction provides the rationale for dif-
ferent allocations of the burden of proof in the two circumstances. 
B. Just!fying Different A/locations of the Burden of Proof 
The courts that have shifted the burden of proof to the govern-
ment in double jeopardy claims have in large part justified the shift 
by noting the defendant's lack of access to proof and the inability to 
grant witness immunity.107 Since consideration of a collateral estop-
pel claim requires an examination only of the record of the prior 
proceeding and the pleadings in the second trial, the access to proof 
and witness immunity problems do not arise. Collateral estoppel re-
quires production of no evidence beyond that already produced in 
the first trial. 
A second justification for shifting the burden of proof to the gov-
ernment is the argument that a protection should not be defeated by 
the procedure required to invoke it. 108 Although the defendant's 
protected interest in avoiding a second trial may be defeated if the 
court imposes upon him the burden of proof in a double jeopardy 
claim, 109 a similar allocation of burdens does not have the same ef-
fect on a collateral estoppel claim. Since the court need only ex-
104. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,444 (1970) (quoting Mayers & Yarbrough,supra note 
94, at 38-39) (emphasis added). 
105. See, e.g., ~he v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970) (at trial for robbery of one of six 
participants in a poker game "jury determined by its verdict that petitioner was not one of the 
robbers"; therefore, the State "could certainly not have brought him to trial again on [the] 
charge" that he robbed another of the victims). While it seems clear that the court need only 
consider the pleadings in the second trial, it is equally clear that, as a practical matter, courts 
will often not be presented with the issue until the second trial has occurred. Under these 
circumstances, the courts consider the record of the subsequent proceeding as well. See, e.g., 
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 439-40 (1970); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382, 1384 (4th 
Cir. 1971). 
106. It should be noted that .double jeopardy claims can be decided on the pleadings when 
the outcome turns on a question oflaw. See, e.g., Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) 
(retrial after a mistrial); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (reprosecution by a different 
sovereign); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (retrial on original charge after convic-
tion on lesser included offense set aside). 
107. See text at notes 32-38 supra. 
108. See text at notes 32-56 supra. 
109. See text at notes I0-I4supra. 
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amine the record of the prior proceeding, the involvement of each 
party is limited to the presentation of its analysis of that proceeding. 
The courts have also justified shifting the burden to the govern-
ment in double jeopardy claims by identifying the possible conflict 
between putting the burden on the defendant and the defendant's 
privileges against self-incrimination, as well as problems posed by 
impermissible prosecutorial discovery.110 Again, only prior proceed-
ings are examined when collateral estoppel claims are raised. The 
court's examination of the verdict and the pleadings will not require 
the defendant to incriminate himself and will not force him to reveal 
facts and potential theories before trial. 
Although one might argue that the burden of proof in criminal 
collateral estoppel should also be placed on the government, the dif-
ferences in what a court must consider in each case allow for differ-
ing placements. It is the prospective element inherent in double 
jeopardy clain;is, the consideration of the facts surrounding the crime 
charged in the second trial, that leads to the conflict with the defend-
ant's rights and the need to shift the burden of proof. Because claims 
of collateral estoppel warrant retrospective examination, their proce-
dural treatment should be distinct from that afforded double jeop-
ardy claims. 
CONCLUSION 
In cases in which double jeopardy claims tum on a question of 
fact, the burden of proof should be on the government. Several 
courts have rejected the traditional rule that places the burden of 
proof on the defendant, reasoning that the government has, among 
other advantages, superior access to proof. Constitutional considera-
tions also warrant placing the burden on the government. These 
constitutional arguments, combined with practical concerns, man-
date that the burden of proof in double jeopardy claims be shifted to 
the government in all cases that tum on a question of fact. 
llO. See text at notes 57-67 supra. 
